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INTRODUCTION
Problems of lawlessness loom large in current 
accounts of Papua New Guinea. Concerns 
about these have induced high levels of 
personal insecurity, as well as providing a major 
disincentive to foreign investment. While such 
problems cannot be resolved by law and justice 
solutions alone, the continuing deterioration 
of PNG’s ‘law and order’1 situation raises 
questions about the adequacy of the formal 
regulatory system. Successive governments have 
been loud with ‘tough’ rhetoric, like many of 
their counterparts elsewhere. Practical responses 
have been essentially reactive and short-term.2 
Australia, PNG’s largest aid donor, has claimed 
to concentrate on institutional-strengthening 
projects with individual law and justice agencies. 
While there have been achievements, it is clear 
that improving the performance of law and 
justice processes is a complex and long-term task 
and one that needs to be integrated with other 
areas of governance reform. 
Building a more effective law and justice 
sector requires strategies that go beyond the 
strengthening of particular institutions. Given 
the operational inter-dependence of law and 
justice agencies, a broader sectoral focus is 
needed. In addition, while the state is the 
central player, there is a need to recognise 
the contributions of other stakeholders to the 
management of conflict and maintenance of 
peace at local levels. PNG’s non-government 
sector, comprising ‘traditional’ structures of 
governance, community groups, churches, 
NGOs and the private sector, already plays 
a significant, if often unacknowledged, role. 
A sustainable law and justice framework 
needs to delineate responsibilities between 
different organisations and develop appropriate 
and mutually reinforcing linkages between 
government and non-government sectors. 
This paper examines the challenges facing 
PNG’s law and justice sector and identifies key 
directions for reform. Section one describes the 
broader context of PNG’s problems of order, 
including the acute fragility of the nation-state 
and the high levels of social and legal pluralism. 
Attention is drawn to the restorative character 
of many ‘traditional’ justice practices and the 
manner of their interactions with colonial 
institutions of social control. Section two 
examines the workings of the modern criminal 
justice system. Its shortcomings are attributed as 
much to a lack of legitimacy and strong social 
foundations as to its patent lack of institutional 
capacity. The final section looks at the recently 
endorsed National Law and Justice Policy (The 
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National Law and Justice Policy and Plan of 
Action) and the prospects for building a more 
socially attuned and effective law and justice 
system.
THE CONTEXT OF CHANGE
The broader context is one of rapid 
change induced by a combination of local and 
global forces that have left few individuals 
or communities untouched. PNG was granted 
independence in 1975 after a relatively short 
and uneven period of colonial administration. 
Over 800 languages are spoken among a 
population of approximately four and a half 
million people scattered across the eastern half 
of the island of New Guinea. The institutions 
and traditions of small, self-regulating societies 
have demonstrated remarkable resilience and 
adaptability in the face of colonial and 
post-colonial change. Twenty-six years after 
independence, the primary allegiances and 
identities of most Papua New Guineans remain 
firmly implanted in local kin-based associations.
Building the institutional framework of 
modern statehood, including a uniform system of 
law and justice, commenced in earnest during an 
intensive period of institutional modernisation 
in the twenty years preceding Independence. 
As in other parts of Melanesia, the birth of 
the new ‘nation’ occurred in the absence of 
any shared sense of identity among its ‘citizens’. 
Binding so many disparate communities into an 
effective political and ideological unit remains a 
formidable challenge.3 
Despite the many gloomy forecasts, Papua 
New Guinea has stayed intact and retains an 
impressive record of uninterrupted democratic 
government. Serious challenges nevertheless 
remain, many of these stemming from the 
fragility of the post-colonial nation-state. The 
tragic and costly 12-year Bougainville war 
provides the most dramatic example. A weak 
national economy is hostage to the vagaries of 
regional and international markets. Levels of 
debt have risen as successive governments have 
been forced to seek loans from the multilateral 
development banks and bilateral donors. 
Economic mismanagement has contributed to 
growing popular discontent. Social indicators 
suggest a serious reversal of early advances, 
particularly in the areas of health and education. 
On a global scale, PNG’s human development 
profile ranks in the lower one-third of all 
nations and is the lowest among all the Pacific 
Island countries.4 Government services are in a 
perilous state in many rural areas, where over 
85% of the population live. While the reformist 
government of Sir Mekere Morauta struggles 
to reverse this pattern of decline, political 
instability, corruption and lawlessness continue 
to pose a major threat.
CRIME AND LAWLESSNESS 
The most visible manifestation of PNG’s ‘law 
and order’ problems is the growth of so-called 
raskol crime in the main urban centres.5 
Serious outbreaks of inter-group conflict have 
also occurred in parts of the Highlands. 
The spread of lawlessness has tended to 
follow larger patterns of development. Hence 
the concentration of organised crime in the 
expanding urban centres, armed hold-ups along 
the arterial highways, and inter-group conflict in 
the vicinity of large-scale resource development 
projects. The incidence of corruption, fraud 
and ‘white-collar’ crime has also increased 
significantly in recent years.
Quantifying the extent of these problems is 
difficult given the paucity and partial coverage 
of available statistics. Criminal justice data is 
largely confined to the urban areas, where less 
that 15% of the total population live. They 
nevertheless suggest a marked growth in crime, 
with a 65% increase in the number of serious 
offences reported to the police over the last 
decade.6 Port Moresby, the national capital, 
accounts for 40% of all reported serious crimes. 
Mount Hagen (Western Highlands) and Lae 
(Morobe) rank second and third respectively. 
With a conservatively estimated population of 
over 313,000,7 Port Moresby has been described 
as one of the most dangerous cities in the 
world.8 Between 1996 and 1998, the capital 
alone accounted for a recorded total of 232 
murders; 3,361 robberies; 2,131 break and 
enters; 556 cases of causing grievous bodily 
harm; 816 serious sexual assaults; 585 drug 
offences; and 307 cases of illegal use of firearms.9 
Media and anecdotal accounts draw 
attention to the violent and predatory activities 
of raskol gangs. Although they tend to be 
concentrated in urban centres, criminal gangs 
are found in many rural areas as well. Sexual 
assaults against women and girls appear to be 
widespread, and are by no means confined to 
gangs.10 Gangs operate with relative impunity in 
the absence of effective deterrence from either 
the police or informal community controls. The 
typical probability of being arrested for crimes of 
larceny has been estimated recently at just over 
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tensions. It also gave rise to new synergies 
and the possibility for creative interaction 
between different regulatory traditions. Ideas 
and practices of law and justice relate to 
particular social and political orders. In western 
societies, the legal system provides the official 
framework for the regulation of relations 
between citizens, corporate entities and the 
state. In practice, many subordinate regulatory 
systems operate alongside, and interact with, 
this formal system.16 The state is nevertheless 
central to understandings, structures and 
processes of law and justice in such a polity. In 
the case of crime, for example, it is the state that 
defines the categories of prohibited behaviour, 
prosecutes those who allegedly engage in them, 
and administers punishment to those who are 
found guilty. 
In ‘traditional’ Melanesia, perceptions and 
practices of justice reflected the social and 
political organisation of small, essentially 
‘stateless’, societies. Rather than being 
centralised in a single entity, authority was 
typically dispersed throughout the social body. 
‘Law’ was an indivisible part of social and 
political life in these societies. Kinship and 
social relations were fundamental to the 
determination of an individual’s rights and 
obligations in respect of others. There was no 
concept of ‘crime’ per se. Disputes were defined 
and resolved within an elaborate framework of 
kinship, status and relationships.17 Notions of 
reciprocity and equivalence were also central to 
the redress of perceived wrongs, as they were 
to other social activities. Given that parties 
to a dispute were likely to continue to live 
in close proximity and interdependence, an 
important objective of dispute settlement was 
the restoration of relations between them. 
Compensation or the exchange of gifts was a 
common form of redress and was generally the 
result of protracted negotiation and mediation 
between the parties and their respective kin 
networks. Principles of restorative justice were 
thus central to the settlement of disputes 
between members of a recognised group or 
community. Where, on the other hand, there 
was no morally binding relationship between the 
parties, as with strangers or members of rival 
groups, retribution or ‘payback’ was a more likely 
response.
Interactions between western law and justice 
institutions and Melanesian processes of self-
regulation provide insight into the challenges 
currently facing the formal legal system in PNG. 
They also reveal important areas of continuity in 
indigenous responses to conflict and wrongdoing 
3%.11 Contrary to their depiction in popular 
stereotypes, gangs are often well integrated into 
their local communities. As well as ties of 
kinship and personal association, raskols engage 
in selective acts of redistribution, providing 
material and other benefits to their neighbours 
in often the poorest and most socially deprived 
urban communities.12
At a macro level, urban raskolism has 
developed in an environment where access to 
legitimate economic opportunities is severely 
restricted. A recent survey estimated that 18% 
of the Port Moresby population rely on crime 
as their principal source of income.13 Raskolism 
has become, in effect, the largest occupational 
category in the informal urban economy. 
Rampant corruption among the political elite 
has also fuelled the rise of raskolism, providing 
a powerful rationalisation for street criminals.14 
Falling commodity prices, deteriorating 
government services and infrastructure have 
contributed to rural poverty and the spread 
of raskolism from urban centres to rural areas. 
These developments, in turn, have placed 
enormous pressure on an already weak criminal 
justice system.
As well as the devastating impact on 
individual victims, concerns about lawlessness 
have undermined commercial and investor 
confidence. They have become major 
constraints to the achievement of national 
and local development objectives. Employers 
in PNG recently ranked theft and crime, 
followed by corruption and then poor 
infrastructure, as the most significant obstacles 
to doing business.15 A reinforcing downward 
spiral has developed whereby rising crime 
reduces legitimate economic activities which, in 
turn, leads to further crime and so on.
Many of the issues underlying PNG’s current 
problems are shared with other developing and 
newly democratising countries. They include 
a potent cocktail of local and global factors 
contributing to uneven development and 
growing levels of division, exclusion and 
poverty. While domestic policymakers and 
international donors scramble for practical and 
timely solutions, it is clear that there are no 
quick fixes. 
FORMAL AND INFORMAL JUSTICE 
SECTORS 
The encounter between different traditions 
of justice brought about by colonialism in 
Melanesia, as elsewhere, generated many new 
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and these, in turn, provide lessons for law 
and justice reform today. The formal system is 
largely a legacy of the period of institutional 
modernisation that preceded Independence. 
Throughout most of the colonial era, there 
was in fact no discrete system of judicial 
administration applying to indigenous subjects. 
Instead, the policing, judicial and penal 
powers of government were part of an 
undifferentiated and decentralised system of 
‘native administration’. This system was 
personified in the Australian district officer 
– the kiap – who acted simultaneously as 
administrator, policeman, magistrate and gaoler 
at local levels. A special set of regulations 
(the Native Regulations), applying exclusively 
to Melanesians, was administered in separate 
courts presided over by the kiaps. 
‘Custom’ – in or out?
‘Custom’ was never officially accorded the 
status of law and no attempt was made 
to incorporate customary institutions into the 
formal government system. At the same time, 
‘traditional’ structures were only interfered with 
when perceived as a threat to colonial authority 
or European prestige18 and continued to shape 
the daily existence of most Melanesians. The 
evolutionary premise of the colonial ‘civilising 
mission’ was that the indigenous population 
would remain subject to their ‘traditional’ 
practices until such time as they had ‘advanced’ 
sufficiently to be fully integrated into the 
‘modern’ legal system.19 Integral to colonial 
thinking was the assumption that there was 
nothing in indigenous methods of governance 
that could provide the basis for a uniform system 
of justice. Linked to this was the belief that 
‘custom’ would eventually die out under the 
impact of ‘civilisation’ or, in a later phase, 
‘modernisation’.
While some district officials argued for the 
recognition of indigenous regulatory processes,20 
opposition was expressed by the long serving 
Australian Minister for Territories, Paul Hasluck 
(1951-1963). Hasluck, the principal architect 
of modernisation, was intent on building a 
system of justice consistent with what he saw 
as the future political needs of the Territory.21 
This entailed the gradual replacement of the 
discriminatory system of ‘native administration’ 
by a modern system of centralised government, 
which, in turn, would provide the institutional 
foundations for eventual statehood.22 While kiap 
justice was a pragmatic strategy for the gradual 
expansion and consolidation of administrative 
influence, it was not seen as an appropriate 
option for the long-term governance of the 
Territory. Establishing a centralised judicial 
system administering a uniform body of law 
was, in Hasluck’s view, a necessary condition for 
the self-government that would one day follow. 
The adoption of an essentially Anglo-Australian 
model of law and justice was proposed in a 
review of the system of judicial administration 
commissioned by Hasluck, the so-called Derham 
Report of 1960.23
Ironically, while official thinking maintained 
that indigenous institutions were inadequate 
to the task, the colonial administration was 
dependent on them in practice for the 
maintenance of peace in most rural areas.24 A 
high level of cooperation and interdependence 
developed between many kiaps, Melanesian 
policemen and ‘traditional’ leaders, including 
unofficial village ‘magistrates’, at local levels.25 
Had official thinking been more receptive, it 
would certainly have been possible to develop 
a framework combining elements of both 
introduced and indigenous systems.
Such a possibility was out of the question, 
however, because it ’was in fundamental 
conflict with the official political goals and 
therefore restricted to an underground 
existence.’26 The growing emphasis on nation-
building that emerged during this period served 
simultaneously to draw attention away from 
the role of indigenous structures of governance, 
including mechanisms for dealing with conflict. 
The subordination of local institutions within 
the larger nation-building project has prevailed 
throughout the post-Independence period and 
conforms to a broader pattern of neglect evident 
in other Melanesian countries.27 
Kiap justice
For many observers, the decision to establish 
a modern centralised system contributed to 
the erosion of local social controls and the 
subsequent growth of PNG’s ‘law and order’ 
problems.28 While there have been many other 
factors at work, there is little doubt about the 
weakening of local regulatory systems. Related 
to this is the marked failure of the modern 
system to facilitate the mutually supportive 
interactions that developed in practice between 
kiap and indigenous ways of doing justice. While 
the Australian kiap may not always have been 
aware of the extent and character of these 
engagements, they were generally conducive to 
the maintenance of peace at local levels. 
Contributing to the relative success of 
the kiap system in dealing with disputes 
was the large repertoire of agency functions 
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entailed a cumbersome and formalistic process, 
all conducted in a foreign language. Professional 
officials, in the form of lawyers, magistrates, 
police officers and so on, now dominated 
proceedings, leaving little scope for meaningful 
participation by parties to the dispute and their 
wider support groups. Local litigants viewed this 
new system as exclusionary, confusing, and often 
profoundly unjust.32 Speaking of the Western 
Highlands, Marilyn Strathern noted that:
The Kiap’s handling of trouble cases 
in the past combined both a concern 
for public order and a capacity to 
deal with minor offences. In fact, these 
derived from different aspects of his roles 
(administrator and magistrate), but it 
meant that he “settled disputes” roughly 
along lines familiar to Hageners. The 
paradox is that although the modern 
official courts are ostensibly concerned 
with law and order, they fail in Hagener’s 
eyes to take cognisance of matters directly 
related to both of these elements.33
Not surprisingly, dissatisfaction with the 
process and outcome of professional justice led 
to a return to older traditions of self-help 
in some areas. Many of these involved the 
use of violence as enhanced mobility created 
new opportunities for conflict. So-called tribal 
fighting – a practice which had been effectively 
suppressed under the kiap system – reemerged 
in parts of the Highlands in the early 1970s. 
The availability of modern firearms provided an 
additional lethal ingredient.
Results 26 years on
Twenty-six years after Independence, minor 
disputes in rural areas are still dealt with largely 
by informal means as they have adapted to 
changing circumstances. The formal law and 
justice sector remains geographically, as well 
as socially, distant for many villagers. It also 
suffers from chronic under-resourcing that has 
seriously affected its operations. Informal means 
vary in different places but are likely to 
include a combination of methods: negotiation 
or mediation by kin, ‘traditional’ leaders or 
church officials; village moots; or the decisions 
of local komitis. Village Courts are also used 
widely and constitute the most important hybrid 
institution established in the post-independence 
period (see below). The effectiveness of informal 
processes is largely a consequence of the degree 
of social cohesion of rural communities. Social 
and economic change has had a seriously 
corrosive effect in many places. A common 
and powers that these officials could draw 
upon.29 These extended well beyond their 
official magisterial powers. The kiap also had 
considerable discretion in the exercise of his 
powers. He could, for example, link dispute 
resolution to the provision or withdrawal of 
various ‘government’ services and facilities. He 
could persuade and reward, as well as punish. 
He could address remedies to either individuals 
or groups. Kiap justice accorded more closely 
with indigenous practices because it approached 
dispute resolution in a more holistic way than 
was possible under formal western juridical 
practice. In doing so, it produced outcomes that 
were generally acceptable in local terms. There 
are important continuities between kiap justice, 
particularly its holistic and problem solving 
approach, and many of the informal restorative 
justice practices that have emerged in Papua 
New Guinea since Independence. 
Semi-autonomous social fields
Kiap justice’s capacity to negotiate the 
seemingly unbridgeable space between the 
requirements of colonial order and indigenous 
perceptions of justice provides an illustration of 
what Sally Falk Moore has described as a ‘semi-
autonomous social field’:
The semi-autonomous social field has 
rule-making capacities, and the means 
to induce or coerce compliance; but it 
is simultaneously set in a larger social 
matrix that can, and does, affect and 
invade it, sometimes at the invitation of 
persons inside it, sometimes at its own 
instance.30 
In practice, if not necessarily by design, 
kiap justice allowed for a high degree of 
articulation between formal and informal fields 
of justice that was, in turn, an important 
contributor to the administration’s much-lauded 
Pax Australiana.31 
By contrast, the incremental processes of 
centralisation and specialisation that followed 
the endorsement of Derham’s proposals served 
to close down or weaken many of the points 
of articulation between formal and informal 
systems that had contributed to peace. In 
the process, the differences between these 
regulatory systems became more apparent, as 
did the deficiencies of the formal system in 
the eyes of many local litigants. Thus, the 
professional magistrate, who replaced the kiap, 
was constrained by all manner of substantive, 
evidential and procedural rules. Professional, as 
opposed to kiap justice, took much longer and 
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complaint relates to the lack of respect shown 
to village leaders and customary authority, 
particularly by youngsters exposed to the urban-
oriented education system and the hedonistic 
values of global culture. Likewise, alcohol abuse 
has weakened social cohesion in both rural and 
urban communities, becoming a major cause of 
violence against women and children.34
The formal system proclaims a monopoly 
over the processing of the most serious incidents 
of conflict and dispute. Its record in this regard, 
however, leaves much to be desired. It has 
proved particularly ineffectual in dealing with 
the large inter-group conflicts that have broken 
out periodically in parts of the Highlands. 
There is evidence in some rural areas of an 
increasingly destructive entanglement between 
the social control processes of state and local 
kin-based associations. Rather than leading to a 
strengthening of overlapping social fields, as in 
the case of kiap justice, this process ultimately 
weakens both and generates further conflict. 
This is most evident in cases where officials 
endowed with state powers use these powers 
for essentially ‘private’ or other ‘unofficial’ ends. 
This would include, for example, the case of 
a police officer using a police raid to punish 
an adversary in a marital dispute,35 or a Village 
Court magistrate responsible for maintaining 
peace and good order who is simultaneously a 
local fight leader.36
It is clear that many ordinary Papua 
New Guineans have little faith in either the 
efficiency or fairness of the formal justice system. 
There is popular perception of a widening gap 
between ‘law’ and ‘justice’. In addition to the 
brutality and violence of many police actions, 
there is a view that those with power and 
influence can manipulate the formal system 
to their own advantage.37 In this respect, the 
deficiencies of the present system relate as much 
to lack of legitimacy, as to lack of institutional 
capacity. 
At the policy level, the incessant debate 
about ‘law and order’ in Papua New Guinea 
has focused on the issue of declining state 
capacity. Restoring law and order has been 
portrayed as a challenge primarily for the state. 
Practical proposals have thus concentrated on 
strengthening the formal sector. Continuing a 
long tradition of neglect, the role of informal 
institutions has been seen as peripheral at best. 
Donor assistance to the law and justice 
agencies has reinforced the centrality of the 
state in this respect. Most assistance continues 
to be in the form of capacity building within 
state institutions. The outstanding challenge 
today is to develop appropriate strategies for 
enhancing the capacity of both the formal and 
informal sectors and linkages between them. 
THE LAW AND JUSTICE AGENCIES 
The Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary 
The Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary 
faces enormous challenges. The scale of existing 
problems of order and PNG’s demanding 
topography would stretch any modern police 
force. In some areas, the police have been 
literally outgunned by groups armed with 
automatic weapons. Many of the factors 
contributing to lawlessness are issues of 
development that go well beyond the realm of 
law enforcement. Expectations of the police are 
often unrealistically high. Lasting improvement 
in the performance of the constabulary requires 
changes in the wider environment and the 
mobilisation of a range of other stakeholders. 
There is a pressing need to overcome popular 
distrust of the police and to develop more 
cooperative and productive linkages with 
community and non-government organisations.
At Independence, police coverage extended 
to only 10% of the total land area and 40% 
of the population.38 Police resources are still 
concentrated in the towns and many rural areas 
are accessible only with considerable difficulty 
and expense. The size of the force has failed 
to match the demands of a growing population 
and escalating lawlessness. In 1975, when crime 
rates were relatively low, there were 4,100 
police officers covering a national population 
of slightly more than 2 million people. At the 
end of 1998, with a total population of over 
4.6 million and serious problems of order, there 
were still only 5,000 police officers, of which 
20% were either reserves or auxiliary officers.39 
Singapore, with a similar population, has more 
than double the number of police operating 
on a small island with excellent transport and 
communication infrastructure.40 
Lack of adequate government support has 
been a major constraint. The bulk of spending 
in the annual budget goes on salaries and wages, 
which, according to some accounts, consume 
80% of the total police budget.41 Funds for 
petrol, airfares, office equipment and other basic 
necessities are scarce and officers-in-charge are 
forced to seek external assistance, often from 
local business houses. The physical condition of 
many police stations and houses is appalling. 
Health authorities condemn police facilities 
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Correctional Services 
The Correctional Service (CS) has been 
the most neglected of PNG’s law and justice 
agencies. Low annual appropriations have been 
barely sufficient to cover wages and basic 
institutional costs. The condition of prison 
facilities and staff housing has deteriorated 
alarmingly over the years with predictable 
effects on the morale of staff and detainees.47
As a method of punishment, imprisonment 
elicits ambivalent views in the wider 
community, being seen as too harsh in some 
cases and too ‘soft’ in others.48 This ambivalence 
also signifies differences in approaches to 
wrongdoing between formal and informal 
systems of justice. Removing offenders from 
society and locking them up in isolated 
institutions fails to deal with many of the issues 
that are central to informal dispute settlement 
processes. There is, for example, no role for the 
community or the parties most directly affected 
by the wrongdoing. Many Papua New Guineans 
view imprisonment as a form of punishment for 
and by the state, one that does little to ‘resolve’ 
the infraction or dispute in question. As such, it 
does not preclude the application of additional 
informal sanctions, such as compensation. 
In practice, imprisonment has also served 
to reinforce, rather than reduce, criminal 
commitment and organisation. Raskol affiliations 
thrive in the major prisons.49 As elsewhere, 
prisons provide a fertile environment for the 
building of criminal identity, the expansion of 
criminal networks and the transmission of new 
criminal skills. Just as policing is implicated in 
the generation of lawlessness, prisons have also 
contributed to the reproduction of criminality 
and violence in contemporary PNG. 
Despite the ‘correctional’ tag, the primary 
role of prison is still viewed as being the 
provision of secure and punitive custody. Lack 
of resources, including trained personnel, has 
contributed to the neglect of rehabilitation 
programs. Activities that do take place – 
vocational training, spiritual counselling, and 
gardening – tend to be dependent on the 
voluntary participation of individuals and 
groups from the wider community. There are 
few follow-up activities or organised support 
programmes for released prisoners.
The CS operates as an integral component of 
the overall law and justice system. As the end-
of-the-line agency,50 many of the problems it 
faces are a consequence of inefficiencies in other 
parts of the system. Currently, over one-third 
of the prison population comprises remandees 
awaiting trial. Delays in court proceedings 
regularly as unfit for human habitation. Barrack-
type accommodation reinforces the separation 
between police and the surrounding community. 
While many dedicated officers struggle to 
maintain standards, poor working conditions 
have had a corrosive impact on morale and 
operational efficiency. 
Disappointing performance in basic crime 
prevention, record keeping, investigation, and 
prosecution are, in part, a consequence of the 
shortage of experienced and specialist officers.42 
It also reflects the constabulary’s colonial 
origins as an institution whose primary role 
was the extension of government control and 
only secondarily the control of crime. Lack 
of adequate on-the-job supervision has also 
contributed to ill discipline. Allegations of 
serious human rights abuses against individuals 
and groups are commonplace.43 
An internal affairs division is responsible 
for managing public complaints against the 
police. In practice, less than 15% of complaints 
are resolved and lengthy procedural delays are 
usual.44 Another disturbing trend in recent years 
has been the theft or disappearance of weapons 
from police armouries. Suspicions abound that 
unscrupulous officers have been selling or hiring 
weapons to criminal groups and those involved 
in inter-group conflicts. 
Lack of capacity and poor community 
relations have contributed to the tendency to 
be confrontational in dealings with individual 
suspects and groups. The superficial ‘strength’ of 
reactive policing disguises the actual weakness 
of the institution. Reactive approaches have 
contributed to popular distrust and fear of the 
police. Police violence fuels criminal violence 
in a reinforcing spiral that becomes increasingly 
difficult to break.45 Violent encounters with 
the police have become part of the process of 
induction into raskolism. While there are now 
serious efforts to develop community policing, 
the concept itself remains unclear in the eyes of 
most people, including many officers. The 1984 
Clifford Report remarked that many police saw 
it as ‘the police being close enough to control 
the community – or at least to instruct it how 
to behave’.46 The same is true of many officers 
today, over sixteen years later, particularly 
in the Highlands. The dominance of this 
retributive approach in contemporary policing 
practice, with its continuous undermining of 
police/community relations, remains the most 
significant source of the constabulary’s current 
weakness. 
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have added greatly to the pressures on the 
prison system, as well as contributing indirectly 
to prison breakouts. Overcrowded institutions 
experience difficulties in feeding and providing 
uniforms for the growing number of detainees. 
Many remandees would be more appropriately 
dealt with in separate remand centres or 
on bail in the community. Likewise, many 
minor offenders could be diverted from prison 
through the provision of adequately supervised 
community-based sentences or by 
decriminalising many minor summary offences.
The Law and the Courts 
The development of a ‘home-grown’ legal 
system was an important theme in PNG’s 
rhetoric of decolonisation. It was envisaged that 
‘custom’ or customary law would play a major 
role in the post-colonial legal order. Indeed, 
the new Constitution explicitly adopted ‘custom’ 
as part of the underlying law that was to be 
developed when no existing law was applicable. 
The National Goals and Directive Principles 
in the preamble to the Constitution expressly 
called for ‘development to take place primarily 
through the use of Papua New Guinean forms 
of social and political organisation’.51 They 
also recognised the importance of community 
structures, calling for ‘traditional villages and 
communities to remain as viable units of Papua 
New Guinea society, and for active steps to be 
taken to improve their cultural, social, economic 
and ethical quality’.52 The constitutional scheme 
was thus receptive to the development of a 
more holistic and restorative approach to crime 
control and conflict resolution, including a 
greater degree of community participation. 
Under the direction of Bernard Narokobi, 
the Law Reform Commission was an early 
advocate of greater integration between western 
and Melanesian legal traditions. A 1977 report 
argued that the formal justice system should 
take greater account of the role of community 
mechanisms for dealing with conflict.53 The 
same report called for wholesale law reform to 
narrow the perceived gap between the values 
governing indigenous communities and those 
embodied in the introduced criminal law.
Despite the idealism of the 1970s, there has 
been little practical progress towards fulfilling 
these aspirations. Few of the recommendations 
of the Law Reform Commission were 
implemented and, in recent years, the 
Commission has lacked adequate funds, effective 
leadership and political commitment. The slow 
pace of the development of the underlying 
law has been blamed on Parliament’s failure to 
enact enabling legislation. This situation has 
been remedied recently with the enactment of 
the Underlying Law Act 2000.54 Others have 
criticised the constitutional scheme, pointing to 
the non-justiciable character of the National 
Goals and Directive Principles, the wholesale 
adoption of pre-Independence laws, and the 
subordinate role of the underlying law in the 
constitutional scheme.55 
Supreme and National Courts
The superior courts – the Supreme and 
National Courts – are occasionally lauded as one 
of the success stories of the post-Independence 
period. There are growing signs, however, 
that the generic problems affecting other state 
institutions are having an impact at even the 
highest judicial levels. An expanding caseload 
has placed great pressure on the court system 
and led to lengthy delays in proceedings. 
The present Chief Justice, Sir Arnold Amet, 
complained recently that ‘the judicial system is 
swamped’ and recommended the development 
of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.56 
Finding suitably qualified citizens to sit as judges 
has long been a problem and there is a growing 
reluctance to recruit overseas candidates. A 
recent survey by the INA found great concern 
among business executives about the declining 
predictability of judicial decision-making.57 
These difficulties have been even more 
marked for the magistrates and staff of the 
subordinate courts who process the bulk of 
formal court cases. There are currently 130 
District Court58 magistrates. This works out 
at only 1 magistrate per 36,5000 people and 
less than 1.5 per administrative district. The 
deteriorating condition of court buildings and 
staff accommodation has also had an adverse 
impact in many areas. 
The courts in the national judicial system 
have a range of non-custodial penalties available 
to them including, for example, probation, 
community work orders, and good behaviour 
bonds.59 A shortage of trained supervisory staff 
and other resources has inhibited their use in 
practice. The idea of probation was proposed 
initially after Independence on the grounds 
that it was consistent with the spirit of the 
Constitution and older traditions of managing 
disputes in the community. The Probation Act 
was passed in 1979. The first operational 
probation service was established in 1981 by 
a local NGO, the Eastern Highlands Province 
Rehabilitation Committee. This initiative 
developed a strong community network and 
became the model for the development of a 
national service.60 
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Probation offices have now been established 
in every province, with the exception of 
Western Province.61 While the use of probation 
is gradually increasing, lack of capacity remains 
a major constraint. In practice, there is often 
only one operational officer available in each 
province to carry out a large number of tasks.62 
The weak capacity of the probation service 
has also had an impact on the workings of the 
Criminal Law (Compensation) Act of 1991. For 
many years the courts have taken account of 
any customary compensation paid by an offender 
to his/her victim as a mitigating factor when 
determining the appropriate judicial penalty.63 
The 1991 Act goes a step further and 
empowers the National and District Courts 
to make compensation orders in addition to 
other penalties imposed for an offence.64 In 
order to assist the courts to determine the 
appropriateness and amount of compensation, 
the Act requires the Chief Probation Officer 
to submit a means assessment report. The 
ability of the probation service to fulfil this 
requirement has been seriously affected by its 
resource problems.65 
Village Courts
Arguably the most significant institutional 
innovation in the law and justice sector since 
independence has been the establishment of 
the Village Courts. The primary function 
of these courts is to ‘ensure peace and 
harmony’, and endeavour to obtain ‘amicable 
settlement of disputes’ and apply custom ‘as 
determined in accordance with the Native 
Customs (Recognition) Act of 1963’.66 Village 
Courts are intended to provide an accessible 
forum for dealing with minor disputes and 
infractions and one that is responsive to the 
needs and expectations of local communities. 
They are presided over by village leaders 
appointed as Village Court magistrates after 
consultation with the people. While designed 
primarily for rural areas, these courts also 
operate in the urban centres. There are currently 
1,082 Village Courts covering approximately 
84% of the country.67 
Responsibility for the payment of allowances 
to Village Court officials was transferred from 
the national government to provincial and 
local governments under the Organic Law on 
Provincial and Local Level Government 1995. 
Provincial and local level governments claim 
that when these functions were transferred, no 
actual funding was transferred with them. As 
a result, many Village Court officials have not 
been receiving their allowances. While some 
continue to work, others refuse to hear cases 
until they receive payment.68 
District Court magistrates are responsible for 
supervising the Village Courts but in practice 
rarely have the capacity to do so. It is not 
realistic to expect 130 District Court magistrates 
to supervise the work of 1,082 Village Courts. 
At the same time, supervision is clearly 
required. There have been many instances of 
Village Courts exceeding their powers under the 
Village Courts Act by, for example, hearing 
cases that should be tried before the formal 
courts, or by unlawfully sentencing offenders to 
imprisonment. 
Many early observers complained about 
the formalism creeping into Village Court 
procedures.69 Illustrations included the 
construction of separate bush material 
courthouses and the holding of regular court 
sittings. Others, however, point to the successful 
synthesis between different traditions 
represented by these courts and their overall 
flexibility.70 The formalism that worries some 
observers may be more a reflection of local 
expectations and the practice of ‘forum 
shopping’ than a deliberate attempt by village 
magistrates to slavishly imitate the formal 
courts. Many villagers simply expect these courts 
to be more formal than the informal local 
forums that they operate alongside. 
A common criticism of the Village Courts, 
particularly in the Highlands, is that they 
reinforce the subordination of women and 
children.71 There have been reports of women 
accused of adultery being imprisoned while their 
male partners go unpunished. Likewise, children 
have been locked up for minor offences. The 
problem here is that the courts have become too 
responsive to local power structures dominated 
by older men. In the process, they have 
compounded the grievances of the weakest 
groups in the community, notably women and 
children. The solution lies in a combination 
of better training that will discourage such 
inequitable outcomes and an effective system 
of supervision that will provide remedies to 
aggrieved parties. It is the weakness of the 
linkage between these courts and the formal 
system that is the source of many of their 
problems. Their strength lies in the provision 
of an accessible legal forum that is highly 
responsive to local expectations. Their location 
between the national court system and local 
dispute resolution mechanisms makes them an 
important point for creative interaction between 
formal and informal justice sectors. With 
appropriate support and supervision, these courts 
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can provide ‘semi-autonomous social fields’ that 
are capable of integrating different regulatory 
regimes at local levels, like kiap justice in an 
earlier era.
DIRECTIONS FOR REFORM 
There have been numerous reports and 
reviews about law and justice issues in PNG 
over the years. As mentioned previously, the 
practical response of governments has been 
the adoption of short-term measures aimed at 
suppressing lawlessness in particular areas. These 
have entailed a familiar repertoire of curfews, 
liquor bans, and special policing operations.
The well-known weakness of the PNG 
policy-making environment72 has been 
accentuated by the sheer number of institutions 
and agencies comprising the law and justice 
sector. Separate departments and ministers exist 
for justice, the police, and the correctional 
service. Each minister exercises a high degree 
of autonomy and no formal mechanism exists 
for ensuring coordination or even regular 
consultation between the various institutional 
components of the sector. In the absence of an 
overall sectoral vision and strategy, each agency 
has been able to develop their corporate plans 
and programmes independently of each other. 
Frequent changes in ministers, agency heads, and 
senior departmental officials have undermined 
further policy coherence in the sector.
The National Law and Justice Policy and Plan 
of Action 2000 
Although policy instability continues to pose 
a major challenge, a window of opportunity 
presented itself with the election of the 
reformist Morauta government in 1999. The new 
government committed itself to an ambitious 
reform programme as part of its strategy to 
restore the integrity of state institutions and 
improve overall government sector performance. 
Establishing a secure and peaceful environment 
was recognised as a fundamental condition for 
the pursuit of other social and economic goals. 
A small working group of senior law and 
justice officials was tasked with preparing a draft 
national policy for the sector. Earlier proposals 
were reviewed, including the 1993 policy, and 
extensive consultations took place with a range 
of stakeholders. The Morauta cabinet endorsed 
the new policy and plan of action on 21st August 
2000. The policy provides the vision statement 
for the sector as a whole, while the plan of 
action consists of a detailed set of proposals 
for achieving this vision.73 These proposals are 
organised around three main pillars. 
(a) Improving the Efficiency of the Deterrence 
System 
The first pillar emphasises the need to 
improve the efficiency of the formal criminal 
justice system and is consistent with ongoing 
and proposed institutional capacity building 
activities. Australia has been funding 
development projects in the law and justice 
sector since the late 1980s. While initial 
assistance focused on the police, capacity 
building projects are now being provided to the 
Ombudsman Commission, the National Judicial 
Staff Service, the Legal Training Institute and 
the Attorney General’s Department.
The new policy recognises that the state has 
a vital role to play in the maintenance of peace 
and good order and that its agencies must be 
appropriately equipped in terms of human and 
material resources. The strengthening measures 
proposed in the policy, however, are directed to 
the sector as a whole, rather than to individual 
agencies. These include strategies to revitalise 
the juvenile justice system and the Law Reform 
Commission, as well as the development of a 
national rehabilitation policy and multi-agency 
approaches to tackling corruption. 
Increasing community participation in law 
and justice processes lies at the heart of the 
new policy and is seen as an integral part of 
institutional strengthening. Emphasis is placed 
on the building of mutually reinforcing linkages 
between state and non-state entities around 
activities aimed at preventing or resolving 
conflict in a variety of social and institutional 
contexts. 
(b) Coordination 
The second pillar relates to the critical 
issue of sectoral coordination. This is premised 
partly on the high level of inter-dependence 
between criminal justice agencies in practice. 
Coordination between agencies is essential 
for ensuring that they operate effectively as 
an integrated system. As well as horizontal 
coordination, there is a need for vertical 
coordination between agencies and non-
government actors operating at different social 
and geographical levels. The Organic Law 
on Provincial and Local Level Government, 
which is currently only partially implemented, 
mandates a major redistribution of functions 
and responsibilities from national to provincial, 
district and local level authorities. This larger 
exercise in decentralisation provides the broad 
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framework for implementing the policy’s vision 
of devolved law and justice and increased 
community participation.
At the national level, the policy 
recommends the establishment of a National 
Coordination Authority comprising the chief 
executives of the law and justice agencies, 
related government departments and co-opted 
members. This body will be responsible for 
the monitoring and review of sectoral policy, 
planning and budgeting, and the coordination 
of law and justice data and research. It will 
also provide oversight of sectoral training, 
liaison with other stakeholders at the national 
level, and cross-sectoral issues. Provincial level 
coordination will be based on the existing 
Provincial Peace and Good Order Committees. 
In addition to representatives from the law 
and justice agencies and provincial authorities, 
these committees will comprise a representative 
group of non-government stakeholders. Their 
functions will be broadly similar to those of 
the national authority. They will also serve as 
a conduit for the flow of information between 
national and local levels.
District-level authorities are proposed to 
assist in the coordination of law and justice 
services in conjunction with local level 
governments. They will be involved in 
identifying and responding to local law and 
justice priorities, allocating resources, and the 
coordination of programs such as community 
policing, community-based corrections and local 
preventive and restorative justice initiatives. At 
the time of writing, a number of ‘community 
justice centre’ pilot projects are being designed 
and these will be used to test and refine 
suitable local-level mechanisms. It is recognised 
that these mechanisms need to be sufficiently 
adaptable to accommodate different local 
circumstances. 
(c) Prevention and Restorative Justice 
The third pillar of the new policy relates 
to crime prevention and restorative justice. It 
seeks to strengthen the capacity of informal 
community-based and other non-government 
structures to prevent and resolve conflict at 
local levels. ‘Restorative justice’ is the term 
used to describe the broad criminal justice 
reform movement that has emerged in many 
countries in recent years.74 It is often contrasted, 
somewhat simplistically, with retributive justice 
whose principal rationale is the deterrence 
of wrongdoing through punishment. While 
most modern criminal justice systems combine 
retributive and restorative principles in practice, 
it is their organisation around processes of 
identifying and punishing individual offenders 
that is used to distinguish them from restorative 
alternatives. Hence the traditional focus of 
criminal process on apprehending suspects 
(the role of the police), ascertaining their 
responsibility under the law (the role of the 
courts) and, if found guilty, the administration 
of punishment (the role of the correctional 
service). There is usually little scope for the 
participation of either the immediate victim(s) 
of the wrongdoing or the wider community in 
this process. 
By contrast, restorative justice provides a 
major role for the community and those who 
have been most directly affected by an 
offence or dispute. Ironically, the restorative 
justice movement in countries like Australia, 
New Zealand, Canada and the United States, 
draws inspiration from the dispute resolution 
methods of indigenous, small-scale societies. An 
important objective of dispute resolution is seen 
as the restoration of balance and harmony in the 
community affected and, wherever possible, the 
healing of relationships damaged by wrongdoing 
or conflict. This involves allowing an offender 
to make amends for his/her infraction and, 
thereafter, to be reintegrated back into the 
community. Violence and other forms of 
wrongdoing are understood as doing damage 
to the fabric of a community and restorative 
practices are necessary to accomplish the 
necessary repairs. This is where law and justice 
activities have the potential for intersecting 
with other community building objectives. 
Empowering communities to manage conflict in 
this way can thus become an important force for 
community development. 
Clearly not all conflicts or infractions 
are suitable for, or amenable to, restorative 
techniques. Retributive justice will always 
remain an option for dealing with the 
most dangerous and intractable offenders. In 
addition, where there are significant imbalances 
in power between particular groups, as in 
the case of women appearing before Village 
Courts, ‘restoring’ relations may simply serve 
to reinforce these underlying inequities. In 
such a case, a form of justice is needed that 
contributes actively to the transformation of the 
imbalances (e.g. ‘transformative’ justice). For the 
vast majority of minor offences and disputes, 
however, there remains enormous potential for 
developing restorative solutions that avoid the 
amplifying outcomes of retributive practice. 
Restorative justice in this broad sense is not a 
new idea in Papua New Guinea. As we have 
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seen, practices like compensation, shaming and 
reconciliation have strong social foundations in 
Melanesian communities. 
Restorative initiatives
There are many examples of restorative 
justice institutions and practices in PNG today. 
Some of these operate independently of the state 
and are, in part, responses to the perceived 
failings or absence of state solutions. Others 
involve linkages or partnerships between state 
and non-state entities. As most of these 
practices are informal and occur in rural areas, 
they are often invisible to the planners and 
officials based in the central government offices 
in Port Moresby or in provincial headquarters. 
At the same time, they provide a rich reservoir 
of experience and innovation with much to offer 
the current reform process.
Mass surrenders and gang retreats are 
a fascinating illustration of an incipient 
restorative practice that has been developed 
in recent years. In the case of the former, 
groups of self-professed criminals surrender 
themselves and their weapons at public 
ceremonies. Surrendering groups ask forgiveness 
for their criminal deeds and assistance for their 
rehabilitation strategies. Surrenders are often 
brokered by church groups or individual pastors. 
Brokers are instrumental in persuading the 
group to renounce crime and, in return, offer 
help in securing access to legitimate economic 
or educational opportunities. The violence 
involved in a life of crime is often given 
as a reason for surrendering. Where court 
proceedings eventuate, magistrates are likely to 
take the fact of surrender into account. Business 
houses and others in positions to help are often 
sympathetic to the plight of such ‘reformed 
criminals’. 
Gang retreats bring criminals together with 
state officials, business and political leaders. As 
in the case of surrenders, church representatives 
often broker retreats. Criminals engage in frank 
discussions with those in positions of authority 
and influence, outlining their grievances and 
identifying what is required to get them to 
abandon crime. Like the surrender, the outcome 
of a retreat can be a commitment to leave crime 
in return for access to legitimate opportunities. 
Unlike criminal justice practice, these informal 
institutions are potentially restorative with the 
capacity for breaking the reinforcing pattern of 
retributive violence between raskols and police. 
They also offer the prospect of sustainable 
solutions by linking exit from crime explicitly to 
employment, education, micro-credit and social 
development options. 
In some areas, voluntary associations have 
been formed to assist in the rehabilitation of 
ex-prisoners and ex-criminals. For example, in 
1984 a group of former prisoners set up the 
Western Highlands Ex-Criminal Self Help Task 
Force. This group continues to operate today, 
producing a weekly programme on the local 
radio and engaging in a variety of spiritual, 
vocational and agricultural training programs for 
‘youth at risk’ and released prisoners. The group 
also visits those in police custody and prison and 
provides informal representation for members of 
surrendering groups appearing in court.
Contrary to their depiction in current 
stereotypes as disorganised and lawless 
communities, many urban settlements have 
well-developed capacities for self-policing. John 
Ivoro, a leader in Port Moresby’s Saraga 
settlement, documents the successful mediation 
of disputes by a local dispute settlement 
committee in a large multi-cultural urban 
community.75 He also tells the story of a 
mutually beneficial partnership forged between 
the committee and a neighbouring private 
company. The company approached the 
committee over their concerns about thefts 
and break-ins at the company premises. After 
listening to community representatives, the 
company agreed to engage local youth in casual 
employment as security guards and provide 
sponsorship to church and sporting activities. 
As a result, criminal activities diminished and 
a relationship previously based on distrust and 
hostility was transformed.
Members of the Saraga dispute settlement 
committee received their mediation training 
from the Peace Foundation Melanesia, an 
NGO that has been helping local communities 
deal with conflict since the mid-1990s.76 
The Foundation offers training modules in 
people skills, conflict resolution, community 
development planning, training of trainers, 
and mediation and restorative justice. These 
modules have been developed with the full 
participation of villagers from many different 
parts of the country and are all linked to the 
general goal of building community cohesion 
and promoting community development. In 
practice, they work through existing community 
structures and local churches. The Peace 
Foundation has also worked with mining 
companies, the police, staff and detainees 
in prisons, and university students. Training 
members of particular communities or 
institutions as trainers has given these initiatives 
a high degree of sustainability in practice.
While the Peace Foundation is probably 
the best-known NGO in this area, there are 
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many others operating at local levels. East New 
Britain’s Sosel Eksen Komiti is a good example. 
Initially established in 1986 as the Social 
Concern Committee of the East New Britain 
Provincial Assembly, they were incorporated as 
an NGO in 1991. Over the years, Sosel Eksen 
has built an extensive network of grassroots 
volunteers throughout rural East New Britain. 
Among its many programmes, it runs workshops 
and training courses directed at reducing drug 
and alcohol abuse, child abuse, and ‘domestic’ 
violence. There are approximately 120 trained 
extension volunteers living and working in 
villages throughout the province.
The peace process that has emerged out of 
the tragic conflict on Bougainville provides a 
rich source of restorative ideas and practices. 
While the conflict centred on the struggle 
between armed secessionists and the PNG 
security forces, it also served as a catalyst 
for many sub-conflicts between and within 
Bougainvillean communities. The collapse of 
state authority left the way open for the 
creation, and revival, of a host of local structures 
and processes of governance in different parts 
of the island. As such, it provides a unique 
opportunity for viewing the dynamics of order 
without state. The ongoing peace process has 
given rise to many innovative and culturally 
based strategies for reconciling the many 
different kinds of conflict provoked by the 
war. While subject to enormous variation, 
‘traditional’ authority, in the form of chiefs, has 
played an important role in many areas:
It reduced the tensions that were often 
the driving force in violent localised 
conflict, including that between BRA and 
Resistance Forces. In some cases the roles 
of chiefs in promoting peace went much 
further. Some exerted control over local 
BRA or Resistance Forces, limiting them 
to defensive roles. Some played major 
parts in initiating reconciliation between 
groups in conflict, a role now increasing 
as the peace process gathers momentum.77 
Women’s groups, churches and NGO’s 
have been active in reconciliation and 
rehabilitation activities with individuals, 
families, ex-combatants, and villages. The role 
of women in the current peace process recalls 
the long history (and longer pre-history) of 
women as peace-makers in Melanesia.78 
The Peace Foundation has also been 
involved in the Bougainville peace process, 
working with chiefs, women’s groups and others 
in the area of mediation, conflict resolution and 
restorative justice.79 John Tombot, a traditional 
chief and former village court magistrate in 
the Siwai district of southwest Bougainville, 
underwent training with the Foundation. Since 
1997 he has been involved in over 300 
mediations including many cases of homicide 
occurring during the conflict.80 He tells how 
many local people in his area believed the 
imposition of fines by the formal courts was 
primarily an income generating activity for 
magistrates. When the war broke out, many 
magistrates were openly attacked and disputes 
that had been dealt with by the courts 
were resumed, often with violent consequences. 
According to Tombot, restorative practices that 
accord closely with ‘traditional’ methods are 
much more successful than formal adjudication 
in achieving sustainable resolutions. 
In other parts of Papua New Guinea, 
the lack of tangible support from distant 
headquarters in Port Moresby has also served to 
stimulate local officials into developing creative 
solutions. In one large provincial prison, the 
commander and his senior officers have gone 
to great lengths to build supportive relations 
with the surrounding community. A local NGO 
has been providing training courses for prison 
staff and their families, as well as detainees. 
Selected inmates have helped build and repair 
local community schools and perform various 
public works. The prison has been contracted 
by a local company to provide detainees for 
sign writing on vehicles. A nearby agricultural 
research centre has been allowed to use prison 
land and detainee labour to grow hybrid guavas. 
From being a depressingly insular institution 
concerned solely with security, this prison has 
become a hive of activity. Regular interactions 
have diminished fears and insecurities among 
the local community about the proximity 
of a large prison. Likewise, the morale of 
detainees, prison staff and their families, has 
risen dramatically.
Challenge is integration
These are a selection of some of the 
restorative initiatives occurring in different parts 
of PNG. Many other examples could be cited. 
These practices have been developed under 
very different local circumstances and involve 
a range of both state and non-state actors. 
The challenge now facing policy makers, law 
and justice practitioners, and community and 
non-government sector leaders, is how to 
integrate these various practices within an 
overall regulatory system. It is the challenge of 
developing ‘semi-autonomous social fields’ that 
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allows the existence of complimentary layers of 
social regulation under the rule of law. These 
levels inevitably draw on different traditions 
and experiences but should ultimately be 
directed at achieving the same overall objective 
– the promotion of peace and good order. 
The new national policy contains specific 
recommendations aimed at ‘community-
building’. These involve the identification of 
particular community needs and priorities and 
the provision of appropriate training and other 
support designed to increase local capacities 
for self-regulation. The policy also introduces 
the notion of ‘partnerships for peace’ whereby 
support will be targeted at preventative and 
restorative initiatives between state and non-
state entities. Wherever practical, support will 
be directed at these partnerships thereby 
building the capacities of formal and informal 
sectors simultaneously and, in the process, 
nurturing a process of mutual learning.
CONCLUSIONS 
It would be naïve to expect that law and 
justice reform alone could overcome PNG’s 
problems of order. These problems are diverse 
and complex and need to be addressed in 
different ways. At the same time, fundamental 
reform is clearly needed. The formal justice 
system, particularly in its criminal justice role, 
has not only failed to stem lawlessness and 
conflict but has, in many ways, become a 
contributor to them.
At the heart of PNG’s challenges of 
governance – including that of ‘law and order’ 
– lies the uneasy fit between the institutions 
and ideology of the modern ‘nation-state’ and 
the multiplicity of indigenous polities that 
constitute modern Papua New Guinea. The 
formal law and justice system is a relative 
newcomer and has been superimposed onto a 
patchwork of self-regulating local systems that 
have by no means ‘disappeared’ under the 
onslaught of modernity and externally induced 
change. On the contrary, the latter have 
been remarkably resilient and have engaged 
actively with institutions of more recent origin. 
Although many of these interactions are 
consistent with building a larger and sustainable 
social order, others are not. 
While the role of the state internationally 
has undergone dramatic changes over the 
past two decades, its central role in national 
development is widely accepted. For many 
observers, PNG is a classic example of a ‘weak 
state’.81 This weakness is manifested in the 
difficulties it experiences in carrying out the 
most basic tasks of statehood, including the 
maintenance of public order, preserving political 
stability, providing basic services, and managing 
the national economy. Building the capacity 
of state institutions, including the law and 
justice agencies, is a necessary response to this 
weakness. Problems arise, however, when the 
state is treated in isolation from its social 
environment. Lack of state capacity is often 
viewed as a ‘technical’ problem to be remedied 
by strategic inputs targeted exclusively at state 
institutions. The question of a state’s relations 
to its wider society and the extent to which 
these might themselves be a source of its limited 
capacity is rarely raised. The fragile legitimacy 
of the state in Papua New Guinea has all too 
often been ignored in the haste to build its 
institutional structures.
An implicit argument in this paper is that 
the weak performance of PNG’s formal law and 
justice system, particularly its criminal justice 
system, is as much an outcome of its lack of 
legitimacy, as it is a consequence of shortage 
of resources, ‘technical’ or otherwise. There 
are growing levels of distrust and disaffection 
with the workings of the formal system. This 
can be seen in the turning away from state 
remedies, the revival of older ways of dealing 
with conflict, as well as in the creation of 
new ones. Restoring faith in the law and 
justice system requires that priority be given to 
improving relations with the wider society it 
exists to serve. Building trust and confidence in 
the principal agencies is an integral part of any 
sustainable institutional strengthening activities. 
Community participation in law and justice 
processes is a necessary part of building the 
social foundations whose absence is a significant 
contributor to the sector’s current weakness. 
While the weakness of the state is widely 
acknowledged, the weakness of PNG 
communities has received less attention. 
Building the conditions for sustainable peace 
and good order requires both a strong state and 
strong communities. Rapid social and economic 
change has taken its toll on even the most 
distant village. Combined with the deficiencies 
of formal processes, the erosion of community 
cohesion has meant a growing absence of 
effective conflict resolution capacities in many 
areas. Empowering communities to deal with 
local problems of order within an overall 
framework of national law is an important 
priority in the National Law and Justice 
Policy. As we have seen, there are already 
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many community-based organisations involved 
in conflict resolution and restorative justice 
initiatives in different parts of the country. 
Some of them already work with state officials 
and agencies, while others work with the private 
sector. Developing partnerships of this kind, as 
envisaged in the policy, is an important way of 
building the capacities of state and civil society 
simultaneously and in a mutually supportive 
way.
PNG’s colonial and post-colonial history 
provides important lessons in the importance 
of developing law and justice strategies that 
can accommodate a degree of semi-autonomy at 
local levels within an overall national system of 
regulation. The relative success of kiap justice 
had less to do with the personal attributes of 
these agents of pacification, as with their ability 
to link the needs of colonial order with those of 
local power structures in a mutually reinforcing 
way. Their ability to approach disputes in a 
holistic manner allowed them to contribute 
to resolutions that were broadly acceptable 
and conducive to the maintenance of peace 
and good order. Local leaders were active 
participants in these processes, rather than 
merely passive bystanders.82 Kiap justice was 
thus able to integrate the requirements of an 
encompassing ‘administrative’ order with those 
of particular ‘local’ orders in a way that the post-
independence justice system has singularly failed 
to do. 
There are strong echoes of this holistic 
approach to conflict resolution in many of the 
restorative justice initiatives that have developed 
informally in PNG in recent years, often in 
response to the failings of the formal system. 
While restorative justice approaches elsewhere 
have attracted criticism for individualising 
responsibility for conflict, the novelty of these 
responses in PNG has been their deliberate 
attempt to address underlying causes, including 
the structural conditions that contribute to crime 
(e.g. by providing pathways back to legitimate 
economic activities). An important source of 
the weakness of the formal system has been its 
failure to address the broader issues of social 
justice that are widely seen as contributing to 
crime and conflict. Indeed, many Papua New 
Guineans view the formal system as reinforcing 
these grievances by, for example, punishing the 
minor criminals while leaving alone those who 
engage in serious abuse of public office. The 
ability of restorative responses to engage directly 
with social justice issues provides an important 
way of building the legitimacy of the law and 
justice system. Contrary to a negative perception 
of law and justice as being solely about control 
and suppression, restorative justice also provides 
a way of integrating law and justice processes 
with more positive and productive development 
activities.
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